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0. Introduction 
This paper deals with the question of what an 
agent (kartr) is in the view of the Pal)iniyas. In 
connection with this question, one might be re-
minded of one of the most famous sitras of the 
A~fodhyayr of Pal)ini, A 1.4.54 svatantra~ karta, 
which defines the term kartr‘agent'. Accord-
ing to this sitra, a kartr is a karaka which is 
spoken of as an independent (svatantra) par-
ticipant in comparison with other participants 
in an act. It is difficult, however, to form a 
clear picture of what an agent is merely from 
this sutra. Of course, one might be referred to 
the Mahabhii~ya of Pata白1jali,where Katyayana 
and Pata吋aliare seen to discuss the question in 
greater detail. This paper, however, bases itself 
on the Va付。：pad/yaofBhartrhari, which, follow回
ing the Pal)inian grammatical tradition, brings 
out points of Pal)ini’s grammar. Naturally, fo・
cus will be on the Sadhanasamuddefa of the 
Vaかapadlya. In this samuddefa Bhartrhari is 
concerned with siidhana, or what brings an action 
to accomplishment, which is just what is referred 
to by the term karaka. 
Not only will Bhartrhari’s clarification about 
the concept of a kartr be helpful in considering 
questions, such as those of what a creator (sra~！r) 
is and what a cognizer (jiatr) is, which we find 
discussed in so many works of classical Indian 
philosophers; it will also be absolutely essen-
tial for a proper understanding of his own meta-
physical theory, the theory of vivarta. For, in 
Bhartrhari’s vivarta theory, the concept of a kartr 
plays an important role. In his view, the dynamic 
aspects of the phenomenal world have their ba-
sis in the time (kiila) power of Brahman and the 
time power is svatantηa which is the power of 
functioning as agent (kartr§akti).1 In this respect 
キMyspecial thanks are du巴toProfessor Brendan S. 
Gillon for helpful suggestions. 
1 Vrti on VP 1.3: kilikhyena hi sνitantrye1:w sarviJ:i 
also we must say that it is important to see how 
Bhartrhari understands what an agent is and to 
grasp the concept of a kartr elaborated by him. 
1. As Pata可aliargues in his Mahiibha~ya, 
the term svatantra in the sutra is a bahuvrlhi 
compound (yasyαsvαm tαntra'!l sα svαtαntr，α抑，
whose constituent tantra signifies being a prin-
cipal thing (priidhanyα）. It is equivalent to the 
term svapradhanα‘one who has the self (sva) as 
a principal thing', as in the utterance svαtantra 
’sau briihmm:ra~ ‘This Brahmin is svatantra or 
independent'. 2 
2. To begin with, let us consider the following 
utterance: 
[1] devadattas tmyjulan edhαi~ sthiilya'!l 
pacati 
‘Devadatta is cooking rice in a pot with fire-
wood’． 
In the situation conveyed by this utterance, the 
person called devadatta functions as agent, while 
the firewood (edha), pot (sthil), and rice grains 
(tmyjula) function respectively as instrument 
(karm:ra), locus (adhikarm:ra), and object (kar-
man). It is interesting that in this situation as one 
has utterance [1], so also one has the following 
utterances: 
[2] sthiill pacαti 
'The pot is cooking [rice]'; 
[3] edha~ pacanti 
'The firewood is cooking [rice]'. 
paratantrii janmavatyaJ:i faktayaJ:i samiivi~fii/:i kilafakti-
vrtim anupatanti I According to Bhartrhari, by virtue 
of the power of functioning independently (svitantrya), 
caled Time, efective things （ぬれi), which ar巴 those
whos巴activitiesd巴pendon factors other than Time and 
hence are causally conditioned (janmavat), come into play 
(samiivi~fa); consequently, th巴yarc what follow the activi-
ties of th巳timepower. 
2 MBh I.334, 17-20: kil1 yasya svarz tantrGl!I sa sνa-
tantraJ:i I .. I asti priidhiinye vartate I tad ya th iI svatantro 
'sau bri/11m:w iry ucyate svapradhiina it gamyate I tad ya~1 
priidhiinye var！σte tantrasabdas tasyedarz grahai:iσml 
? ?? ?
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The person called devadatta performs the acts 
of putting a pot on the stove, pouring into it wa-
ter and food grains, setting fire wood under it, 
etc. Similarly, the pot performs the act of con-
taining grains and the firewood carries out the act 
of burning up to the point where the grains are 
soft. Since the meaning of a verb is a composite 
of component actions, these acts are denoted by 
the same verb. 
The person called devadatta, the firewood, and 
the pot are assigned the name kartr by the sitra 
in question. 3 They are said to be independent 
with respect to their own actions (svavyapara), 
although they are respectively an agent, an irト
strument, and a locus, relative to the principal 
action of cooking. It may be said in this con-
nection that Devadatta is called a principal agent 
(pradhanakartr) and others subordinate agents. 
However, a question arises: Then what differ-
entiates Devadatta from other karakas? Patafijali 
gives the following answer: 
MBh 1.326.10: yat sarve~u sadhane~u 
saf!1nihite~u karta pravartayita bhavatil 
“Because when al sadhanas [i.e., karakas] are 
present, it is the agent who sets them into play.” 
According to Patafijali, the principal agent is 
that karaka which sets others into play. Naturally 
this implies that the subordinate agents are those 
karakas which are set into play by the principal 
agent. 
3. In view of this Bha~ya Bhart~hari states the 
following karikas: 
VP3. 7. 101 : prag anyata(l §aktilabhan 
nyagbhavapadanad api I 
tadadhlnapravrttitvat pravrttaηa1?1 nivarta司
natJグ
VP3.7.102： αdr~f atvat pratinidhe(l praviveke 
ca darsanat I 。radapy upakaritve svatantryaf!1 kαrtur ucy-
ateグ
“Even if a [principal agent] helps from a dis-
tance a main act to be brought to accomplish-
ment, the [principal] agent is said to be inde-
3Vts. 8 I 0 onA 1.4.23: adhifraym:iodakiisecanata-
~ujuliivapanaidhopakar~a!Jakrかii!1pradhiinasya kartu!1 pi-
ka~ I dro~w1.n pacaty dザ＇haka1?1pacatfti sa'!l.bhavanakriyi 
dhiira!wkriyii ciidhikara!wsya pika!1 I edhii~ pak~yantyii 
vikliter jvali,syantltijvalanσわかikara!zasya pika!1 I 
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pendent or a principal factor, for the following 
reasons: 
(1) because he acquires his power before the 
operation of the other karakas and from some 
other source (prag anyata(l saktilabhat); 
(2) because he keeps the others subordinate to 
himself (nyagbhavapadanat); 
(3) because the others start off their activities 
depending on him (tad，αdhf napravrttitvat); 
(4) because he holds the others back from con-
tinuing their activities (pravrttanaf!1 nivarta・
nit); 
(5) because no substitute for him is seen 
(adr~fatvat pratinidhe(l); 
(6) because he is seen to be present even when 
the others are not (praviveke darsanat）.” 
Before moving on to the main task, it is desir-
able to explain the point that the principal agent 
helps from a distance a main act to be brought 
to accomplishment. The key to this point is that 
by A l.4.42 sadhakatamaf!1 karmy,am Pai:ini as-
signs the name karmy,a 'instrument’to that karaka 
which most serves to bring about an act. In the 
situation conveyed by [1], the firewood, which 
functions as instrument, is considered to be that 
karaka which most serves to bring the main act 
of cooking to accomplishment. Devadatta, on 
the other hand, has to be said to help in the ac-
complishment of the act of cooking from a dis-
tance in comp訂isonwith the firewood. Thus, 
what Bhart~hari has in mind in making the above-
mentioned point is that, in comparison with an in-
strument, an agent is said to help the main act to 
be brought to accomplishment, from a distance.4 
Now let us consider the characteristics of the 
main agent. 
3.1. priig anyata(l saktilabhat 
First, to be an agent is to be one who acquires 
a power to bring an action to accomplishment, 
from what is different from other karakas set into 
play by him, before the other karakas operate. 
This will be explained as follows. Devadatta 
who desires rice gruel (odana) sets into play the 
.i According to Bhart~hari, a thing is spoken of as instru-
ment when its own activity is viewed as immediately pr巴一
ceding th巳accomplishmentof an action. 
VP 3.7.90: kriyiiyii~ parini,spatir yσdνyipirid ana-
ntaram I νiνak~yate yadi tatra kara!WfVG'!l tadi smrtam I 
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。rewoodand others which serve to bring to ac-
complishment the act of cooking that leads to the 
softening of the rice grains, namely the rice gruel. 
He first desires the rice gruel and then obtains 
access to the firewood and others and sets them 
into play. 5 Accordingly, it is proper to say that 
Devadatta, who has obtained access to the other 
karakas, can bring the act of cooking to accom-
plishment by means of setting them into play. We 
have to note that to acquire the power of bring-
ing the act of cooking to accomplishment （ぬk-
tiliibhα） isto reach the state of being capable of 
exercising such a power.6 Obviously, it is be-
cause he desires the rice gruel that Devadatta ob-
tains access to the other karakas. The acquisition 
of the power, therefore, must be said to be from 
some source other than the other karakas （αnyル
taf:z). In addition, it is unquestionable that such 
acquisition takes place before those other karakas 
operate (priik). For, unless they are set into play 
by Devadatta who has the power of bringing the 
act in question to accomplishment, they cannot 
operate.7 
3.2. nyagbhiiviipiidaniit 
Secondly, to be an agent is to be one to whom 
other karakas are subordinate. 
All karakas are said to be independent with re-
spect to their own actions. The firewood func-
tions independently with respect to its own action 
of burning up. It is plain that the functioning of 
the firewood is brought about by Devadatta who 
brings it into use as the instrument of the act of 
cooking (kartrviniyogα）. When it is in depen-
dence on Devadatta that the firewood can func 
tion independently with respect to its own act, the 
firewood is properly described as being subordi-
nate to the principal agent Devadatta. 
3.3. tadadh!napravrttitviit 
Thirdly, to be an agent is to be one, in depen-
dence on whom other karakas start off their activ-
ities. To put it in a clearer way, to be an agent is 
男Prakafoon VP3.1. l 01: phalakamo hi kartii kara!1iidfny 
upa1jayate I 
前Itis interesting to not巴thatBhartrhari uses th巴term
vrttiliibha 'th己acquisitionof a function’in the sens巴ofth巴
activation of a function. See Vrtti on VPl .13 I 132. 
7 Praka§a on VP3.7.101: karm:ziidfna1.n tu kartrviniyogiid 
r叩 svavyiipiiresviitantryaれ m tv σnyata~ I 
to be one who sets other karakas into play (pra-
vartaka). 
This characterization has already been given 
by Patafijali. The point is clear. The firewood, 
set into play by Devadatta, perfoロnsits own ac-
tivity, while Devadatta performs his own activ-
ities of his own accord when he wishes to ob-
tain the fruit of the act of cooking. We must say 
that the activity of the firewood depends on Deva-
datta, for, set into play by Devadatta, it performs 
its own activity. 
3.4. pravrttaniiY(l nivartaniit 
Fourthly, to be an agent is to be one who stops 
other karakas from continuing to function (ni-
vartanii). 
When Devadatta is cooking rice grains, he will 
hold the firewood back from continuing to bum 
up for fear that the firewood should heat the pot to 
the point where al the water evaporates and the 
grains burn dry-to say nothing of Devadatta’s 
stopping to function of his own accord when he 
has reaped the fruit of the action. 
3.5. adr~.tatviit pratinidhef:z 
Fifthly, to be an agent is to be one for whom 
another agent is not seen to be substituted. 
We have the Vedic injunction vrzhibhir yajeta 
'He shall sacrifice with rice grains'. When the 
rice grains are not available, wild rice grains 
(n!viira) can be substituted for them.8 Similarly, 
when the firewood is not available, Devadatta can 
substitute some other inflammable thing for it 
to bring the act of cooking to accomplishment. 
When Caitra is cooking rice grains, however, it 
cannot be said that he is substituted for Deva-
datta. Whoever desires the fruit of an action and 
is capable of bringing the action to accomplish-
ment is qualified to perform the action insofar as 
not prohibited from performing it.9 If Devadatta 
8Bhartrhari notes that wh巴na subsidiary thrng necessary 
for a ritual act, obligatory or optional, is not available, the 
substitution for it has to be made so that the ritual act should 
be brought to completion. VP2.70: asa1?1nidhau pratinidhir 
ma bhiin nityasya karmai:zσ！i I kamyasya vi pravrttasya Iopa 
ity upapadyate I 
リVrtion VP2.65: saty apy arthitνt dme’pi siima-
rthye §astre~1iiparyudastasyadhikaro yukta~ I Prakiifo 
on VP3.7.102: kartrantara1?1 hi kriyii?J nirvartayat 
pr，σti1ihitm1 nocyate I tasyiipy arthina(1 samarthasyii-
paryud，σstasyiidhikiiriit I 
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who desires the fruit of the action cannot engage 
himself in the act of cooking for some reason, 
it follows that there is no agent who sets other 
karakas into play, so that the action itself is not 
brought to accomplishment.10 For other karakas 
substitution should be made by an agent in order 
to bring to accomplishment the act intended by 
him. 
3.6. praviveke dar§anat 
Sixthly, to be an agent is to be one who is seen 
to operate alone in the absence of other karakas. 
This characterization. of an agent is applica-
ble to an agent of the act signified by an object-
less verb. Consider the utterance devadatto 'sti 
‘Devadatta is'. It is observed that Devadatta is 
present even when the firewood and others are 
not present. One might ask where he is. To be 
sure, a locus is essential for the act of being.11 
But a certain place is said to be the locus with re-
spect to the act of being, when the place serves 
as the locus of an agent of the act of being. The 
agent is thus said to be directly related to the act 
of being in comparison with the locus.12 What is 
more, one understands from the finite verb asti 
that the act of being is inseparably connected 
with the agent. This shows that every act requires 
an agent or that there is no act which is devoid of 
an agent.13 If every act requires an agent and if 
not every act is followed by other karakas, then it 
is established that an agent is a principal factor in 
the accomplishment of an act. 14 
10Prakasa on VP3.7.102: asambhave ca pravartayitur 
evabhava?z I 
11Not巴thatPar:iniyas hold that the meaning of the verb 
m‘b巴’isan action (kriya). See Ogawa [2005: Section 6]. 
128巴Jar匂acals th巴 agentin this case‘one who is 
capable of dir巴ctlybringing the act to accomplishment’ 
(sak~atsamartha). Prakafa on VP3.7.102: sak~atsamartha­
sya kvacid anytinapek~ai:ziit praviveke ca darsanam .. I 
13Prakafa on VP3.7.102: yady apy atradhikarm:zadaya~ 
sambhavanti tathtipi nintarf）’akas te sabdavytiptirad 
apratfyamanafi I tatas cakartrkayafi kriyaya abhavat 
sambhityakiiribhyo ’pi visi~yate karta I 
14 According to Kaiya¥a, it is determined that an agent 
is a principal factor in comparison with other karakas, 
when th巴followingboth hold: (I) When oth巴rkarakas 
ar巴 absent,an agent alone isseen to occur; (2) When 
an agent is absent, other karakas ar巴 not s巴巴nto ocur. 
Pradゆaon MRh ad A 1.4.23 (1.384）：目 karai:zidyabhive’PY
aste sete ityidau kevalasya kartur darfaniit kartrahitinilJl 
karm:zidfnim adarfaniit pridhinya'Jl kartuh I 
4. So far we have seen how the principal agent, 
Devadatta, in utterance [1] is characterized. It 
is also interesting to see how he is characterized 
if he is prompted to perform the act of cooking 
by somebody else. Consider the following utter-
ance: 
[4] pacayαty odanaf[l devadattena yajiiadattaf:t 
‘Yaj白adattacauses Devadatta to cook rice 
gruel'. 
Here Devadatta is assigned the name kartr by 
A 1.4.54, so that the third triplet ending is used 
after the nominal base devadatta. Now a difι 
culty arises. How can the prompted agent be said 
to be an agent, since being prompted he lacks 
independence in undertaking an action? This is 
comparable to the case where in utterance [1] 
the firewood and others, being set into play by 
Devadatta, lacks independence in relation to the 
main act of cooking. In utterance [4] Deva-
datta becomes a subordinate agent. He is called 
prayojyakartr‘an agent who is prompted to do 
something', while Yaj白adattais called prayojル
kakartr‘an agent who prompts someone else to 
do something'. 
In connection with the question mentioned 
above, we have to note the following karikas 
of the Vaかαpαdlya,where Bhartrhari establishes 
that the agent who is prompted by another is not 
different from the other independent agents about 
whom there is no doubt. 
VP3.7.122: saf!lbhavαnat kriyasiddhau kartr-
れ1enasamafritaf:t I 
kriyayam atmasadhyayaf!l sadhananaf!l pra-
yojakaf:tll 
VP3.7. l 23: prayogamatre nyagbhavaf!l 
svatantηad eva nisritaf:t I 
avisi~f o bhavaty αnyaif:t svatantrair 
F仰 ktasaf!tsayaif:tノグ
“'An agent who is prompted by someone else 
is not distinguished from other unquestionably 
independent agents for the following reasons: 
( 1)because the agent who is prompted is con 
ceived in a prompter’s imagination to be an 
agent who contributes to the accomplishment 
of an action (saf!lbhavanat kriyasiddhau kartr-
tvena sαmafri加わ；
(2) because the agent who is prompted sets 
sadhanas into play for the accomplishment of 
-96-
B巴ingan Agent (Ogawa) 
the action which he has to bring to accomplish幽
ment (kriyayam atmasadhyaytlfJ1 sadhananalJ1 
prayojakaf:i); 
(3) because he becomes subordinate to the 
prompter with respect simply to the act of 
prompting (prayogα） which is performed by 
the prompter, precisely because he is inde-
pendent with respect to the act to be per-
formed by himself (prayogamatre nyagbhii-
va'!i svatantηad eva ni.fritaf:i)ア
Let us consider briefly these three reasons. 
4.1. sa1J1bhavanat kriyasiddhau kartrtvena sama-
.fritaf:i 
In the situation expressed by utterance [4], De-
vatatta has been chosen as the agent for his capac-
ity to accomplish the action. Suppose that De-
vadatta is currently not engaged in cooking rice 
grains. Yaj負adatta,who assumes that Devadatta 
is capable of bringing the act of cooking to ac-
complishment, incites the latter to perform the 
act. Therefore, Devadatta who is prompted to do 
the cooking is one who has been determined to 
have the power to bring the act to accomplish-
ment and who is assumed to bring the act to ac-
complishment. Thus, in Yaj白adatta’simagination 
(sambhiivana), Devadatta is conceived to be ca-
pable of bringing the act of cooking to accom-
plishment. We must recall that in the situation 
conveyed by [I], it is taken for granted that De-
vadatta’s accomplishment of the act of cooking 
presupposes his power to perform that act. 
4.2. kriyayam atmasadhyaytlfJ1 sadhananalJ1 pra-
y。ifakaf:i 
In the given situation, Devadatta engages the 
other sadhanas to do the action which they can 
accomplish. 
As said above, in utterance [l] Devadatta is 
said to be one who sets the firewood and oth-
ers into play. In the present utterance also he 
must be characterized in the same manner. A 
simple determination of him as being capable of 
performing the act of cooking will not do. For, 
if Devadatta, even if he has the power to do the 
act, is indifferent and inactive, Yaj白adattacannot 
prompt Devadatta to perform it. Consequently, in 
the present case Devadatta must be one who sets 
into play things necessary for him to bring the 
act of cooking to accomplishment. Devadatta in 
the situation conveyed by [4], who sets the things 
into play, thus meets the condition for being an 
agent of the act of cooking he himself has to per-
form. 
4.3. prayogamatre nyagbhiiva1J1 svatantηad eva 
ni.fritaf:i 
It is plain, furthermore, that in the situation 
conveyed by [4] Devadatta is prompted by Ya司
j白adattaand so becomes subordinate to the later 
just because of his independence with respect to 
his own activities. 
In the present situation, there is no contra-
diction between Devadatta’s being prompted and 
his being independent. For, if Devadatta who is 
prompted to cook is not independent with respect 
to his own activities as mentioned earlier, he can-
not set into play karakas for the accomplishment 
of the act of cooking, so that the act of cooking 
itself is not brought to accomplishment. Here 
also we must recall that Devadatta in the situa-
tion conveyed by utterance [l], being a princi-
pal agent, is characterized as one who sets other 
karakas into use. 
4.4. What al this shows is clear. Devadatta, even 
in the situation expressed by utterance [4], does 
not lose the status of being a principal agent with 
respect to the act of cooking. It is to be noted that 
Yaj白adattathere is assigned the name hetu as well 
as the name kartr by A 1.4.55 ta伊rayojakohetuf:i, 
according to which Yaj白adattais to be considered 
as a karaka which plays the role of causing an 
independent one, Devadatta, to participate in the 
act of cooking. 
5. It has been said that in the situation conveyed 
by [4] Devadatta is described as being subordi-
nate to Yeり白adattawho prompts the former to 
ca町yout the act of cooking. Bhartrhari goes on 
to present a different idea that even in the given 
situation there is no subordination of Devadatta 
to Yajfiadatta. 
VP3. 7 .124: nimittebhyaf:i pravartante sarva 
eva svabhutaye I 
abhiprayanurodho ’pi svarthasyaiva pra-
siddhayeグ
“Everyone performs an act for their own bene-
fit when caused to perform the act. Following 
the wishes of another is also to fulfil one’s own 
pu叩ose.”
??? ?
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This karika is stated on the basis of the follow-
ing passages of the Mahabhii!jya: 
MBh Il.35.25-36.1 (on A3. l .26): neha kascit 
para’nugrahftavya iti praναrtαte I sarvαime 
svabhutyarthaf!I praνartante I 
“In this world nobody takes action with the 
idea that somebody else should be benefited. 
[On the contrary] here everybody takes action 
for their own benefit.” 
Mhh II.36.8-9 (on A3. l.26): yadi tarhi sαrva 
ime svabhutyarthaf!I pravartante kαh pra-
yojyiirthaf:i I yad abhipriiye:ju sajjαnte I 
“［Question] Then if here everybody takes ac町
tion for their own benefit, for what pu叩oseare 
they prompted to take action? [Answer] For 
the purpose of meeting a prompter’s wishes.”15 
The point made by Pa9iniyas is this. Everyone 
takes action for their own benefit. They perform 
an act with the desire of gaining benefits from 
performing the act. In this respect they have no 
dependence on others in the accomplishment of 
the act. In the situation conveyed by [4], Deva-
datta follows Yaj白adatta’swish to have the act of 
cooking brought to accomplishment by the for-
mer. But Devadatta does so precisely because he 
thinks that following Yajiiadatta’s wish also re-
suits in conferring a bene負ton himself. 
Thus it is clear that in Pa9iniyas’view the de-
sire to reap some benefit (sviirthαlipsi) plays an 
important role in taking action.16 If we take this 
view into consideration, we may, therefore, rea-
sonably say that to be an agent is to be one who 
takes action for one’s own benefit. 
6. I have been so far concerned solely with an 
agent who is an animate being. One might argue 
that no inanimate thing can have such a desire 
with which it can become an agent. But as a mat-
ter of fact, it cannot be denied that an inanimate 
thing can become an agent as in utterances [2] 
and [3]. I will not elaborate on this point. Suffice 
it here only refer to following karika: 
VP3.7.103: dharmair abhyuditαif: fobde 
niyamo nαtu vastuni I 
l月Uddyotaon MBh ad A3. I .26 (II.95 96）：・ preraki-
bhipraye~v asajjante I tadabhiprayal'(l )Fiatνd tam nivarta-
yanti I 
i行Prakaiaon VP3.7. l 24: svarthalipsayii sarva/1 pra-
vartσmiina~ paridhlnati1?1 praνrtau nasadayari I 
karq・dharmavivak!f iYi.f!1 
pratfyate Jグ
§abdiit kart i
“With reference to a thing as it is spoken of 
and not to a thing as it is, it is determined on 
the basis of the properties mentioned above [in 
VP3.7.101-2] whether it is an agent. When 
a speaker wishes to convey the properties of 
an agent with reference to a certain thing, the 
thing is understood to be an agent from the 
words.” 
It is obvious that when a speaker intends to 
convey a certain thing as having the six char-
acteristics described in the preceding karikas, 
VP3. 7. IO 1-102, the property of acquiring the 
power and so on, 17 the thing becomes an agent. 
7. Conclusion 
From what has been said above, it should be 
concluded that, as Pata白dalihas an insight into 
it, being an agent consists in being one who sets 
other karakas into play. The agent’s setting them 
into play is preceded by his acquiring the power 
to perform his own activities which lead to the 
accomplishment of the main act. The acquisi-
tion of such a power is also preceded by his wish 
to enjoy the fruits of the act or to reap benefit 
from the act. Thus al the characteristics of an 
agent, described in 3.1-3.6, except that described 
in 3.3, are involved in his feature that he sets 
other karakas into play (pravartaka, prayojaka). 
We have to recall in this connection that Patafi-
jali offers an analysis of the process involved in 
any action in six stages: saf!Ipasyatikriyii‘men-
tally conceiving something，→priirthayatikriyii 
’wishing for it’→ adhyavasyatikriyii‘deciding 
on a course of action’→ iirambha 'undertaking 
the action，→nirvrtti‘bringing it to completion’ 
→phalii.vapti‘obtaining the fruit of the action' .18 
There is no question that within the framework of 
this action process Paηiniyas try to define what an 
agent is. 
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